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THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT IS A
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPANSION OF RIGHTS
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
For almost a half century since Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,1 conservatives have railed against liberal judicial activ-
ism.2 Republican presidential candidates from Richard Nixon to
Bob Dole have campaigned against the Court and have excoriat-
ed what they perceive as judicial activism. Almost three decades
after the end of the Warren Court, at a time when the Supreme
Court and all federal courts remain dominated by Republican
judges, the attack on liberal judicial activism continues. In July,
1997, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings titled Judi-
cial Activism.' Thomas Jipping, a prominent conservative critic
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Law and Political Science, University of
Southern California. I am very grateful to Roger Smith for his excellent research
assistance.
1. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Text of 96 Congressmen's Declaration on Integration, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1956, at 19 (criticizing Brown as impermissible judicial activism); see also
ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
DECLINE 4 (1996) (arguing modem liberalism is the source of American decline);
ROBERT BORIC, THE TEMPTING OF AMERIC: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
8-9 (1990) (criticizing the judicial branch for improperly making moral and political
decisions).
3. See Judicial Activism, 1997: Hearings on S.J. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on
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of the courts, wrote an editorial in August, 1997, expressing
"[c]oncern about a federal judiciary out of control.'
The irony is that the real judicial activism of the 1990s is in a
conservative direction. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
City of Boerne v. Mores' is extremely important on many levels,
including as a striking example of conservative judicial activism.
Ultimately, Mores posed basic questions concerning the relation-
ship between the Court and Congress in interpreting the Consti-
tution, between the power of the federal government and the
states in protecting rights, and between a narrow and a broad
content for a basic constitutional right.
The Court resolved these issues by choosing in favor of its
own power and invalidating a statute overwhelmingly passed by
Congress. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the result, and
however one defines judicial activism, this is it. Moreover, the
Court rejected the federal statute, in part, based on federalism
concerns and the perceived need to protect states from such fed-
eral encroachments.6 Additionally, the obvious effect of Mores is
to reduce protection of free exercise of religion by returning the
law to the test articulated in Employment Division v. Smith:7 A
neutral law of general applicability does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause.8 The invalidation of a federal statute on feder-
alism grounds and the substantial narrowing of the scope of con-
stitutional rights are obviously conservative victories. Mores, by
any measure, is dramatic conservative judicial activism.
This observation, however, does not mean that the Court de-
cided Mores wrongly. Identifying it as "activist" and "conserva-
tive" is descriptive. Although it is true that critics usually re-
serve the phrase judicial activism to attack decisions with which
they disagree, the reality is that activism and restraint are nei-
the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 105th Cong. 2847 (1997).
4. Thomas Jipping, Fighting for Justices, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at 15,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers file.
5. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
6. See id. at 2171.
7. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Because Flores delcared RFRA unconstitutional as an
exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it re-
mains uncertain whether RFRA is constitutional as to federal government actions.
8. See id. at 885.
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ther inherently good nor bad. Rather, each case must be ana-
lyzed normatively to assess judicial activism's desirability. If
nothing else, perhaps Flores will reveal how absurd it is for con-
servatives to lament liberal activism from a Supreme Court that
is controlled by five conservative Justices and that lacks a single
progressive Justice in the mold of William Douglas, William
Brennan, or Thurgood Marshall. The judicial activism of the
1990s, as Flores powerfully illustrates, is conservative.
What makes Flores wrong is not its activism or its conserva-
tism, but instead its failure to accept a basic constitutional prin-
ciple, most clearly expressed in the Ninth Amendment: Other
government institutions, federal and state, may expand the
scope of constitutional rights.9 Congress, by statute, may confer
more rights than the Court finds in the Constitution. The Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) ° is constitution-
al because in it, Congress, by statute, expanded constitutional
rights.
1
This defense of RFRA can be presented as a simple syllogism.
Major premise: Congress, acting under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment ("Section 5"), statutorily may create more
constitutional rights than recognized by the Supreme Court, so
long as Congress does not dilute or lessen rights.
Minor premise: RFRA is a statute, enacted under Section 5, that
creates more constitutional rights and neither dilutes nor less-
ens rights.
Conclusion: RFRA is constitutional.
Part I of this Essay defends the major premise of the syllo-
gism: Congress, acting under Section 5, may expand the scope of
rights. Part II examines the minor premise and explains why
the Supreme Court should have recognized RFRA as a statute
creating additional rights. Part III considers what might be done
now to protect free exercise of religion in light of Fores's im-
proper invalidation of RFRA.
By any measure, Fores is an enormously important decision.
It speaks to basic issues concerning the powers of Congress and
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
11. See id.
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the Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution. It concerns
the scope of Congress's authority under an increasingly impor-
tant constitutional provision-Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 As the Court narrows the scope of Congress's
commerce power, in cases such as United States v. Lopez," al-
ternative sources of congressional authority, such as Section 5,
grow in significance.14
Perhaps most importantly, Flores means that people in the
United States will have far less protection for their religious
practices. Laws of general applicability-whether prison regu-
lations, zoning ordinances, or historical landmark laws-that
seriously burden religion might have been challenged successful-
ly under RFRA, but not any longer. Put most simply, Flores
means that many claims of free exercise of religion that previ-
ously would have prevailed now certainly will lose. People in the
United States have less protection of their rights after Flores
than they did before it. This, in short, is why Flores was decided
wrongly.
I. MAJOR PREMISE: CONGRESS, ACTING UNDER SECTION 5, MAY
EXPAND THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. The Issue
The Constitution's protection of rights long has been under-
stood as the floor-the minimum liberties possessed by all indi-
viduals. The Ninth Amendment provides clear textual support
12. While this article was in production, an excellent critique of Flores was pub-
lished by Professor Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996
Term-Comment: Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997). Professor McConnell carefully reviews Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion in Flores and persuasively argues for a presumption of
deference in favor of laws adopted by Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
13. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
14. Moreover, the Court's recent decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), increases the importance of the scope of Congress's Section 5 powers. In
Seminole Tribe, the Court held that Congress, by statute, may override the Eleventh
Amendment and authorize suits against state governments only when acting pursu-
ant to Section 5 and not when acting under its Article I powers such as the Com-
merce Clause. See id. at 59-60. This makes the scope of Section 5 critical in deter-
mining the ability to sue states in federal court to enforce federal laws.
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for this view in its declaration: "The enumeration in the Consti-
tution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people." 5 The Ninth Amendment
is a clear and open invitation for government to provide more
rights than the Constitution accords.
State governments certainly can expand protective rights both
by judicial decisions and by statute. For instance, in PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 6 the Supreme Court held that the
California Supreme Court could recognize a state constitutional
right to use shopping centers for speech purposes,' even
though previously the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that no
such right exists under the U.S. Constitution. 8
Likewise, there is no doubt that Congress, by statute, can pro-
vide rights greater than the Court recognizes in the Constitu-
tion. For example, private race discrimination does not violate
the Constitution because it lacks government action. Federal
civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination in private places of
accommodation and by private employers create statutory rights
in which the Court has found no constitutional protections. 9
This seemingly obvious premise, based on the Ninth Amend-
ment, that Congress can expand the scope of rights, means that
Congress may do so even when it disagrees with a Supreme
Court decision that refused to find a right in the Constitution.
Some critics of RFRA emphasized that Congress should not be
able to overrule the Supreme Court's "reading" of the Constitu-
tion.2" But if the Court reads the Constitution to not include a
right, Congress or the states may act to create and protect that
right. In other words, the Court's interpretive judgment that a
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
16. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). PruneYard is discussed in more detail in infra text ac-
companying notes 110-18.
17. See id. at 81.
18. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976).
19. See, for example, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964), and Katzenbach u. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), that upheld Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting racial discrimination in places of public accom-
modation.
20. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 443 (1994) (crit-
icizing RFRA as a subversion of the Court's constitutional judgment).
1998] 605
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particular right is not constitutionally protected is in no way
incompatible with a legislature's statutory recognition and safe-
guarding of the liberty.2'
Therefore, if Congress enacts a statute that expands rights,
the key question is whether Congress has authority under some
constitutional provision for its action. It is axiomatic that Con-
gress may act only if it can point to express or implied constitu-
tional authority.22 One possible source of congressional authori-
ty is the Commerce Clause, which Congress used to prohibit pri-
vate discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'
Another logical source of authority is Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the focus of the Flores decision. Section 5 is
brief and states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."' 4 The is-
sue, then, is what does this provision mean; may Congress use it
to expand the scope of rights? More specifically, is Congress lim-
ited to providing remedies for violations of constitutional rights
recognized by the Supreme Court; or may Congress use its power
under these amendments to adopt an independent interpretation
of the Constitution, even overruling Supreme Court decisions?
B. The Inadequacy of Justice Kennedy's Attempt to Define
Congress's Section 5 Power
As is usually the case with difficult constitutional issues, the
answer to this question cannot be found in the Constitution's
text or the Framers' intent. The word "enforce" is sufficiently
ambiguous to allow either view as a plausible interpretation of
Section 5. The Supreme Court in Flores claimed that the word
necessarily means that Congress only can remedy and that Con-
gress cannot determine the substantive meaning of rights."
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated:
21. Part II argues that RFRA should be seen as a statutory expansion of rights.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995) (stating that
Congress's powers are limited to those enumerated in the Constitution).
23. See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The same issues can be raised as to Congress's
powers under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment that contain almost identical language.
25. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997).
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Congress' power under §5, however, extends only to
"enforc[ing]" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.... The design of the Amendment and the text of §5
are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the
power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the states. Legislation which
alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said
to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a con-
stitutional right by changing what the right is.26
But this begs the key question of what enforce means. One
dictionary defines "enforce" as: "Urge, press home (argument,
demand); impose (action, conduct upon person... ); compel ob-
servance of."27 Another dictionary defines "enforce" as: "1: to
give force to: strengthen 2: to urge with energy 3: constrain,
compel 4: ... to effect or gain by force 5: to execute vigorous-
ly."' From the perspective of these definitions, Congress very
much is enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment when it expands
the scope of liberty under the Due Process Clause or increases
the protections available under the Equal Protection Clause. In
this sense, congressional expansion of rights enforces, by
strengthening, the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dictionaries, of course, do not determine the meaning of words
in the Constitution. My point is simply that there is nothing
about the meaning of "enforce" that supports Justice Kennedy's
claim that Congress is precluded from expanding the scope of
constitutional rights. Justice Kennedy argued as if the term en-
force had a precise meaning that supported his position as the
correct way to understand Congress's Section 5 power. No such
precise meaning exists.
Phrased slightly differently, "enforce" might be defined in
many alternative ways, two of which are "to implement" and "to
remedy." Justice Kennedy chooses the latter.9 But the former
seems equally plausible in the context of Section 5. That defini-
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 270 (1925).
28. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 275 (7th ed. 1965).
29. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
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tion, gives Congress the authority to implement, as best it can,
the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as due pro-
cess and equal protection."0 Congress can expand the scope of
these rights if it decides that is the best way to ensure, or to
implement, these protections.
I am not making the strong claim that my definition is correct
and Justice Kennedy's is wrong. Rather, my point is that the
literal language of the Fourteenth Amendment does not answer
the question of whether Congress may use its Section 5 power to
expand the scope of constitutional rights. This is hardly surpris-
ing; rarely does the literal language of the Constitution resolve
difficult contemporary constitutional issues.
Nor does the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers
answer the issue. Even assuming that Framers' intent should be
controlling in constitutional interpretation, a premise that I re-
ject,3 there is no indication that the Framers ever considered
the issue when they drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Flores argued that the legis-
lative history of Section 5 resolves the issue. Justice Kennedy
declared: "The Fourteenth Amendment's history confirms the
remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement
Clause." 2
Justice Kennedy asserted that Congress's rejection of the
Bingham Amendment shows that Congress meant Section 5
power to be remedial only."3 Specifically, Representative John
Bingham had introduced a draft amendment that would have
provided:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States, and to all persons in the several States equal protec-
tion in the rights of life, liberty, and property.34
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
31. See ERWiN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987) (arguing
against originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation).
32. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
33. See id. at 2164-65.
34. Id. at 2164.
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Justice Kennedy said that there was strong opposition to this
provision and that the revised provision, the current Section 5,
was not opposed in the same manner.35
The revised Section 5 has less sweeping language than the
Bingham proposal. Yet, the debates Justice Kennedy quotes are
silent on whether Congress's power should be only to remedy
what the Court determines to be a constitutional violation or
whether it includes congressional authority to expand rights. 6
All that Justice Kennedy demonstrated is that Congress enacted
language with narrower phrasing. Justice Kennedy completely
assumed the substantive difference in the phrasing.
In fact, Justice Kennedy's quotations fail to support his posi-
tion that Congress intended Section 5 to be only remedial in
scope. Justice Kennedy quoted Representative Bingham as say-
ing that the new version would give Congress "the power.., to
protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the
citizens of the Republic... whenever the same shall be abridged
or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State."" Justice
Kennedy next quoted Representative Stevens that the new draft
amendment "allow[s] Congress to correct the unjust legislation
of the States."" Finally, Justice Kennedy quoted Senator
Howard as stating that Section 5 "enables Congress, in case the
States shall enact laws in conflict with the principles of the
amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal congressional
enactment."39
None of these quotations supports the view that Congress's
power is solely to remedy violations of judicially defined rights
and not to expand rights safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Surely, RFRA can be seen, in Representative Bingham's
words, as protecting rights or as, in Representative Stevens's
35. See id. at 2164-65.
36. See id For an excellent review of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
and an exploration of why it does not support Justice Kennedy's conclusion, see
McConnell, supra note 12, at 174-83. Professor McConnell concludes his review by
stating: "Section Five was born of the conviction that Congress-no less than the
courts-has the duty and the authority to interpret the constitution." Id. at 183.
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language, "correct[ing] the unjust legislation of the States."40
Laws expanding the scope of rights are very much in accord
with Senator Howard's goal of advancing the principles of the
amendment. A careful reading of the legislative history that Jus-
tice Kennedy invoked reveals that it persuasively supports ei-
ther view.
Again, I am not making the strong claim that the legislative
history of Section 5 means that my interpretation is correct as
opposed to Justice Kennedy's view. Once more, the point is more
limited: Nothing in the Framers' intent resolves which approach
to Section 5 is preferable. The Framers simply did not consider
whether the Constitution limited Congress to remedying viola-
tions of judicially-recognized rights or whether Congress could
use its power to recognize new rights.
In addition to text and Framers' intent, the Court claims that
precedent supports its view that Congress's power is only reme-
dial. Justice Kennedy said that "[t]he Court has described this
power as 'remedial." 4 Yet, a close look at the precedents shows
that they provide better support for the opposite conclusion:
Congress may use its Section 5 powers to expand rights.
Katzenbach v. Morgan42 is the leading case interpreting Sec-
tion 5. Morgan held that Congress, under Section 5, may inde-
pendently interpret the Constitution and even overturn the Su-
preme Court.4" Morgan concerned the constitutionality of sec-
tion 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965," which provides that
no person who has completed sixth grade in a Puerto Rican
school, where instruction was in Spanish, shall be denied the
right to vote because of failing an English literacy re-
quirement.45 Earlier, in Lassiter v. Northampton Election
Board,45 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an
English language literacy requirement for voting.47
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2164.
42. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
43. See id. at 648-49.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1994).
45. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 641.
46. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
47. See id.
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By enacting the Voting Rights Act, Congress sought to partially
overturn Lassiter by providing that failing a literacy test could
not bar a person from voting if the person was educated through
the sixth grade in Puerto Rico. The Supreme Court in Morgan
upheld this provision as "a proper exercise of the powers granted
to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."48
The Court offered two reasons to support this conclusion. First,
Congress could have concluded that granting Puerto Ricans the
right to vote would empower them and help to eliminate discrimi-
nation against them.49 In essence, this is an argument that the
law was constitutional because it remedied discrimination.
Second, the Court held that Congress could find that the liter-
acy test denied equal protection, even though this conflicted with
the Court's earlier holding in Lassiter."° This second reason is
much more significant because it accorded Congress the authori-
ty to define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite
Justice Kennedy's attempt to minimize this aspect of the deci-
sion,5' the Morgan case clearly articulates that Congress under
its Section 5 power could expand the protection against discrimi-
nation by prohibiting the literacy tests.52
A specific issue before the Supreme Court in Morgan was
whether Section 5 limited Congress to remedying what the
Court defined to violate the Constitution, or whether Congress
could independently interpret the Constitution.53 The state of
New York argued that Congress could not use its Section 5 pow-
er to determine independently the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but instead only could provide remedies for practic-
es that the Court deemed unconstitutional.54
48. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 646.
49. See id. at 652.
50. See id. at 652-53.
51. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2168 (1997).
52. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
53. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649-50.
54. See id at 648. This was also the position taken by Justice Harlan in a dis-
senting opinion joined by Justice Stewart. Justice Harlan wrote:
When recognized state violations of federal constitutional standards have
occurred, Congress is of course empowered by § 5 to take appropriate
remedial measures to redress and prevent the wrongs .... But it is a
judicial question whether the condition with which Congress has thus
1998]
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In rejecting this approach, the Court spoke broadly of
Congress's powers under Section 5 and expressly rejected the
view that the legislative power is confined "to the insignificant
role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch
was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional."5 The Court ex-
plained that "[bly including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to
Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary
and Proper Clause.""6
In fact, Justice Harlan, dissenting in Morgan, took exactly the
same view as Justice Kennedy in -ores. He contended that en-
forcing meant remedying and that Congress could not use its
Section 5 powers to determine the substantive meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Justice Harlan wrote:
The question here is not whether the statute is appropriate
remedial legislation to cure an established violation of a con-
stitutional command, but whether there has in fact been an
infringement of that constitutional command, that is, wheth-
er a particular state practice, or, as here, a statute is so arbi-
trary or irrational as to offend the command of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That ques-
tion is one for the judicial branch ultimately to determine.58
But Justice Harlan was the dissenter; Justice Brennan's majori-
ty opinion explicitly rejected his position.
Justice Kennedy deals with Morgan by saying: "There is lan-
guage in our opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan which could be
interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legis-
lation that expands the rights contained in Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This is not a necessary interpretation,
sought to deal is in truth an infringement of the Constitution, something
that is the necessary prerequisite to bringing the § 5 power into play at
all.
Id. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 649.
56. Id. at 650.
57. See id. at 667 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 39:601612
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however, or even the best one."59 Justice Brennan's majority
opinion in Morgan expressly argued that Congress may expand,
but not dilute, rights.0 Justice Harlan in dissent argued that
Congress's power is limited to remedying violations of rights rec-
ognized by the judiciary. Justice Brennan, however, clearly re-
jected Justice Harlan's position that Congress's power was pure-
ly remedial.
Moreover, other cases support Congress's authority under the
post-Civil War Amendments to interpret independently the Con-
stitution.6' In City of Rome v. United States,62 the Court ruled
that Congress had the authority under Section 2 to interpret the
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment. City of Rome involved a
challenge to changes that a city adopted after the enactment of
the Voting Rights Act.63 Specifically, the city annexed a sub-
stantial number of outlying areas and thus altered the racial
composition of its electorate and also adopted provisions for
59. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2168 (1997).
60. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
61. Another major case to consider Congress's authority under Section 5, Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), does not add much to the debate due to the absence
of a majority opinion. The 1970 amendment to the Voting Rights Act prohibited all
literacy tests and required that anyone 18 years and older could vote in both state
and federal elections. See id. at 117. The Court unanimously upheld the prohibition
of literacy tests on the ground that this was necessary to remedy an historical form
of discrimination. See id at 118. But by a 5-4 decision, the Court declared the 18-
year-old vote unconstitutional. See id. Unfortunately, there was no majority opinion.
Justice Black took the position that Congress could set the age for voting in federal
elections, but not state elections because of federalism concerns. See id. at 126-31
(Black, J., announcing judgment of the Court). Justices Douglas, Brennan, White,
and Marshall concluded that Congress could set the age for federal and state elec-
tions because of its power under Section 5 to determine the meaning of equal pro-
tection. See id. at 135-50 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 239-50 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Finally, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Harlan
argued that Congress has no authority to decide the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See i& at 152-54 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id at 293-96 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.). Indeed, Justice Harlan explained that "Congress's
expression of [its] view . . . cannot displace the duty of this Court to make an inde-
pendent determination whether Congress has exceeded its powers." Id. at 204
(Harlan, J.). However, Justice Harlan's position here was a dissenting view rejected
by the majority.
62. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
63. See id. at 159-61.
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majority rather than plurality vote for selecting city commis-
sioners.' The federal district court found no evidence that
these changes were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.'
On the same day it decided City of Rome, the Court held in City
of Mobile v. Bolden66 that at-large election systems were consti-
tutional absent proof of a discriminatory purpose.67 Therefore,
the City of Rome's actions did not appear to violate the Four-
teenth or Fifteenth Amendments.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled against the City of
Rome based on the Voting Rights Act. Although Bolden held
that proof of a discriminatory intent was a prerequisite to a con-
stitutional violation," the Court in City of Rome concluded that
Congress could "prohibit changes that have a discriminatory im-
pact."69 City of Rome thus authorizes Congress to interpret in-
dependently the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment even if
that entails a view contrary to that of the Supreme Court. The
Court in Bolden said that discriminatory impact was insufficient
to show a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but in City of
Rome, the Court upheld a statute allowing discriminatory im-
pact to establish liability.
Establishing that precedent supports allowing Congress to ex-
pand rights only demonstrates that Justice Kennedy was disin-
genuous in claiming that prior case law supported his position.
However, precedent alone should not dictate the scope of
Congress's Section 5 powers. The best response to precedent
could be that the Court should simply overrule it.
C. Interpreting Section 5
Thus, neither the text, the Framers' intent, nor precedent re-
solves the question of Congress's Section 5 power. The meaning
of Section 5 must be decided based on policy considerations. I
believe that this is virtually always the case in constitutional
64. See id. at 160.
65. See id. at 172.
66. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
67. See id. at 62.
68. See id.
69. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177.
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law and that rarely can descriptive sources answer normative
questions about the desirable meaning of the Constitution.
So what policy reasons does Justice Kennedy offer to support
his view of Section 5? Justice Kennedy invoked the need to pre-
serve the Court as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitu-
tion. Justice Kennedy quoted Marbury v. Madison and wrote: "If
Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth
Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'su-
perior paramount law unchangeable by ordinary means.' It
would be 'on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other
acts,... alterable when the legislature shall please to alter
it."'70 Justice Kennedy concluded this part of the majority opin-
ion by declaring: "Shifting legislative majorities could change the
Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed
amendment process contained in Article V."71
This is the fundamental flaw in Justice Kennedy's opinion: He
equated a Supreme Court decision that failed to find a right in
the Constitution with the conclusion that Congress can create no
such right. The former, however, in no way entails or implies
the latter. The Court's conclusion that a particular right does
not exist in the Constitution does not mean that the right can-
not exist through other legal sources, such as federal or state
legislation.
In other words, Justice Kennedy made a crucial error when he
assumed that a Supreme Court decision that did not find a con-
stitutional right to exist precluded the legislative process from
recognizing such a right. If the Supreme Court concludes that
the Constitution requires government to act in a particular way,
then Congress cannot overturn that result. For instance, Con-
gress cannot by statute violate or ignore the mandate of Gideon
v. Wainwright2 that the government must provide counsel in
criminal cases in which there is a potential sentence of impris-
onment. Similarly, if the Court decides that the Constitution
prohibits the government from acting in a specific manner, Con-
70. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2168 (1997) (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
71. Id. at 2168.
72. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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gress cannot authorize the forbidden conduct. For example, no
legislature can overturn the holding of Roe v. Wade 3 that the
Constitution prevents the government from prohibiting abortion.
But it is inherently different when the Court decides that no
right exists in the Constitution. Such a ruling means that the
government is unconstrained by the Constitution and may act as
it wants. This includes the power of the legislature to create the
very right that the Court concluded is not constitutionally pro-
tected. Had the Court in Roe v. Wade found no constitutional
protection for the right to abortion, Congress and state legisla-
tures still would have had the power to create and safeguard
such a right by statute. As explained in Part II, this is what
RFRA did: The Court in Smith found no constitutional right of
individuals to have an exemption from neutral laws of general
applicability that burden religion.v4 Congress, in RFRA, created
a statutory right to protect individuals from such laws, except in
cases where the government could meet strict scrutiny.75
Justice Kennedy's approach to Section 5 suffers from another
important flaw: He assumed that it is possible to meaningfully
distinguish between laws that remedy violations of rights and
statutes that interpret the Constitution. Justice Kennedy's ma-
jority opinion states: "While the line between measures that
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that
make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to
discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining
where it lies, the distinction exists, and must be observed."76
The problem is that any law expanding rights also can be
characterized as a remedy for a problem. The legislature only
acts based on perceived ills that require solutions. Congress can
almost always tie these perceived ills to some constitutional
claim. The Court in Flores accepted that Congress enacted the
Voting Rights Act, and its amendments under Section 5, to rem-
edy discrimination in voting.77 Likewise, Congress adopted
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
75. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
76. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
77. See id. at 2169. But see Stephen Carter, The Morgan Power and the Forced
Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 819, 841 (1986) (argu-
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RFRA because of its perception that often neutral laws of general
applicability wrongly limited people's religious freedom."
Limiting Congress under Section 5 to remedies simply imposes
a fact-finding burden on the legislative process. Congress can
enact any law expanding rights under Section 5, but it first must
document the existence of a problem and call its action remedial.
There is, however, no constitutional requirement for legislative
hearings or fact finding. Indeed, the presumption in favor of up-
holding laws assumes that the legislature found sufficient facts to
support its action unless it can be shown that the law serves no
legitimate purpose or is not rationally related to the end. As Pro-
fessor Cohen observed, once it is assumed that Congress is a bet-
ter forum for determining issues of fact, congressional determina-
tions of factual sufficiency should not need any evidence at all. 9
Demonstrating the error in Justice Kennedy's interpretation of
Section 5 does not, however, explain why the alternative ap-
proach to Section 5 is preferable; there still needs to be an argu-
ment as to why the Court should interpret this provision to allow
Congress to recognize and protect additional rights. The Court
should have concluded that Section 5 is not limited to remedial
legislation, but rather allows Congress to expand rights for two
primary reasons.
First, the protection of additional rights is inherently desirable
under the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment, so often forgot-
ten, is significant here." The Ninth Amendment is a constitu-
tional reminder that the rights in the Constitution are just the
minimum and that the existence of these rights in no way denies
the existence of other liberties.8 ' The Ninth Amendment is a
powerful signal encouraging the recognition of additional free-
doms beyond those explicitly created by the Constitution.
ing that there was insufficient fact finding to justify concluding that the Voting
Rights Act is remedial).
78. In fact, Justice Kennedy cites to the extensive testimony in congressional hear-
ings supporting this view. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
79. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 612 (1975).
80. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
81. For an excellent collection of essays on the Ninth Amendment, see THE
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE (Randy Barnett ed., 1993).
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How can other rights come into existence? One way, of course,
is for the Court to interpret the Constitution to protect rights
not enumerated in its text. In Griswold v. Connecticut,82 Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Brennan, invoked the Ninth Amendment as support
for a constitutional right to privacy." Another crucial way for
additional rights to arise is for legislatures, including Congress,
to create and protect them.
Where possible, the Court should interpret the Constitution to
fulfill the Ninth Amendment's teaching and allow government to
create additional rights. In other words, when choosing between
two plausible interpretations of a constitutional provision, one
that grants the legislature the authority to safeguard additional
rights and one that does not, the Court should choose the for-
mer. As described above, there are two ways of interpreting
Section 5, one that permits Congress to use its authority to
expand rights, and the alternative, which limits Congress to
remedying violations of Court-recognized rights.' The Court
should choose the former under the principle that increasing
rights is presumptively desirable under the Constitution.
The reality, of course, is that in a particular instance recogniz-
ing a right might be socially undesirable. The general consensus
is that judicial protection of a fundamental right to freedom of
contract at the time of Lochner v. New York' era was
undesirable.86 I certainly would not favor creating a right for
individuals to sell their labor under any terms they wish, thus
preempting state and local minimum wage and maximum hours
laws. The Constitution, however, grants Congress the authority
to create additional rights, and it is for the political process to
ensure their social desirability. There is no articulable principle
that would empower Congress to create only good rights and not
82. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
83. See id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
84. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
85. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
86. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Economic Due Process Revisited, 44 VAND. L. REV.
213 (1991) (reviewing PAUL KENS, JUDIciAL POWER AND REFORM POLnCS: THE
ANATOMY OF Lochner v. New York); Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Eight-
Hour Day, CAL. LAW, April 1994, at 56.
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bad ones. The only limit on the legislature is that in creating
new rights it cannot violate other constitutional provisions. Most
notably, as Justice Brennan observed in a footnote in Morgan,"
and as discussed below, Congress cannot dilute rights, it can
only expand them." The presumption under the Constitution is
that increasing individual rights is good, and the Court should
interpret Section 5 to fulfill this objective.
A second reason makes it desirable for the Court to allow
Congress to expand constitutional rights under Section 5: It is
preferable to allow each branch of government to interpret the
Constitution so long as those definitions do not violate Court-
defined constitutional rights. Every government official, at every
level of government, takes an oath to uphold the Constitution.
From the earliest days of the country, presidents have claimed
equal authority with the Court in interpreting the Constitution.
For example, presidents such as Thomas Jefferson and Andrew
Jackson have asserted their right to interpret the Constitution.
Jefferson wrote:
[Nothing in the Constitution has given... [the judges] a
right to decide for the Executive, more than the Executive to
decide for them. Both magistrates are equally independent in
the sphere of action assigned to them. The judges, believing
the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine
and imprisonment; because that power was placed in their
hands by the Constitution. But the executive, believing the
law to be unconstitutional, were bound to remit the execution
of it; because that power has been confided to them by the
Constitution. That instrument meant that its co-ordinate
branches should be checks on each other. But the opinion
which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are
constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in their
own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive
also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic
branch. 9
87. 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
88. See id.
89. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 11 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49, 50-51 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905).
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Similarly, President Andrew Jackson declared in vetoing a bill
to recharter the Bank of the United States:
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for
itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each
public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution
swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not
as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the
House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President
to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution
which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it
is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them
for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more
authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has
over the judges, and on that point the President is indepen-
dent of both.9"
Indeed, all sides of the political spectrum recognize that the
other branches of government have independent authority to
interpret the Constitution. As explained above, Justice
Brennan saw Congress as vested with the power under Section
5 to expand the content of constitutional rights.91 From the
opposite end of the political spectrum, former Attorney General
Edwin Meese argued that each branch has the authority to
decide for itself the meaning of constitutional provisions."
Meese remarked: "The Supreme Court, then, is not the only in-
terpreter of the Constitution. Each of the three coordinate
branches of government created and empowered by the Consti-
tution-the executive and legislative no less than the judi-
cial-has a duty to interpret the Constitution in the perfor-
mance of its official functions."3
I do not agree with the implications of the statements by Jef-
ferson, Jackson, and Meese that the other branches have the au-
thority to claim their interpretation equal to or superior to the
90. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 576, 582 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).
91. See, e.g., Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.
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Supreme Court's. 94 I believe that long ago Marbury v. Madi-
son95 resolved this with its declaration that "[iut is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is."96 To say that the Court is the authoritative interpreter
of the Constitution, however, does not imply that the Court is
the only interpreter. Every legislator and every executive official
should interpret the Constitution, and these interpretations are
controlling unless there is a Supreme Court decision to the con-
trary. As explained above, a Supreme Court ruling that the Con-
stitution does not protect a specific right in no way precludes the
legislature from interpreting the Constitution to safeguard that
liberty; a law protecting a right is in no way inconsistent with a
judicial determination that the right is not constitutionally re-
quired." Professor Tribe lucidly explained this when he wrote:
It is not difficult to reconcile congressional power to define
the content of fourteenth amendment rights with Marbury v.
Madison and judicial review. Judicial review does not require
that the Constitution always be equated with the Supreme
Court's view of it. It is the Court's responsibility under
Marbury, to strike down acts of Congress which the Court
concludes to be unconstitutional-nothing more.98
In recent years, many constitutional scholars have supported
the view that constitutional law is best understood as a dialogue
between the Court, the other branches of government, and soci-
ety.99 As Professor Stephen Carter has argued forcefully, allow-
ing Congress to protect a right pursuant to Section 5 in response
to a Supreme Court decision refusing to recognize a constitution-
94. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court should be regarded
as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note
31, at 81-105.
95. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
96. Id. at 177.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
98. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 349 (2d ed. 1988) (footnote
omitted).
99. See, e.g., PHILLiP BOBBiri, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1986); Barry Friedman, Dia-
logue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993).
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al right furthers this notion of constitutional dialogue."0 Legis-
latures cannot reverse Supreme Court decisions finding that the
Constitution prohibits or requires government conduct. Legisla-
tures, however, can act when the Court finds no right in the
Constitution because such a finding in no way implies a limit on
the legislative power to create and protect the additional liber-
ties statutorily.' °'
In other words, it is preferable to interpret Section 5 to give
Congress the authority to expand rights both because increasing
rights is presumptively desirable under the Constitution, and
because independent constitutional interpretation that is not in-
consistent with Supreme Court rulings is desirable. Limiting
Congress to providing remedies for violations of court-defined
rights, which is Justice Kennedy's approach, loses both of these
benefits and thus should be rejected.
D. Why Not?
Three major arguments caution against giving Congress inde-
pendent authority to expand rights under Section 5. First, Con-
gress could use this power to dilute or infringe upon constitu-
tional rights.0" The argument is that if Congress can use its
power under Section 5 to interpret the Constitution, then it con-
ceivably could use this authority to dilute or even negate consti-
tutional rights. Justice Brennan responded directly to this con-
cern in a footnote to his Katzenbach opinion:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, § 5 does not grant
Congress power to exercise discretion in the other direction
and to enact "statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protec-
tion and due process decisions of this Court." We emphasize
that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting mea-
sures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants
Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guar-
antees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the
100. See Carter, supra note 77, at 852-56.
101. For an excellent development of this position, see Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer,
Disposing of Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S.
CAL. L. REv. 589 (1996).
102. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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States to establish racially segregated systems of education
would not be-as required by § 5-a measure "to enforce" the
Equal Protection Clause since that clause of its own force
prohibits such state laws."°3
In other words, Section 5 is a "one-way rachet" that allows Con-
gress to expand, not contract, rights.'
The response to this argument is that it assumes a clear dif-
ference between laws expanding rights and those that "restrict,
abrogate, or dilute" rights. Often, because laws help some and
hurt others, they can be characterized either as an expansion or
a contraction of rights depending on the perspective. For exam-
ple, conservatives proposed that Congress use its power under
Section 5 to declare that the word "person" in the Fourteenth
Amendment includes fetuses from the moment of conception."5
Under Justice Brennan's theory such a declaration could be un-
constitutional as a dilution of a woman's right to obtain an abor-
tion, or it could be constitutional as an enlargement of the rights
of fetuses. Affirmative action provides another illustration: Does
it constitutionally enlarge the rights and opportunities of minori-
ties or does it unconstitutionally dilute the rights and opportuni-
ties of whites?
First, it is a logical fallacy to say that because sometimes the
line distinguishing an expansion from a dilution is unclear that,
therefore, it always is unclear. Undoubtedly, there are hard cas-
es here as in every area of constitutional law, but generally the
difference between more and less is obvious. There is no reason
to believe that granting more protection for the rights of some
always entails reducing the rights of others. For example, in
Morgan, Congress's prohibition of some literacy tests that the
Court had found constitutional expanded the right to vote for
some citizens, but it took away rights from no one. Likewise,
RFRA expanded the safeguards for religious freedom by protect-
ing individuals from the burdens of neutral laws of general ap-
103. Id. at 651-52 n.10 (citation omitted).
104. TRIBE, supra note 98, at 346.
105. See Human Life Bill of 1981, S.158, 97th Cong. (1981). The "Human Life Bill"
is reprinted in GEOFFREY STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 258 (2d ed. 1991).
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plicability; the law infringed upon no one's constitutional
rights.' In Flores, allowing the church an exemption from an
historic preservation law so that it could build a new facility
would have diminished no one's rights.
Second, again a distinction must be drawn between situations
where the Court has found that the Constitution prohibits or
requires government action and those where the Court has
found no constitutional limit. If the Court concludes that the
Constitution commands or forbids government conduct, then the
legislature cannot by statute overturn that judgment. For exam-
ple, in the abortion context, the Court's determination that legis-
latures may not prohibit abortions before viability' 7 precludes
Congress from doing so, even if Congress claims to safeguard
other rights in the process. Where, however, the Court rules that
the Constitution is silent as to a matter and that no constitu-
tional right exists, laws creating and safeguarding the liberty
are permissible. This is the key difference between the Human
Life Bill'0° and the Voting Rights Act °9 or RFRA. Through
the Human Life Bill, Congress would have prohibited what the
Court interpreted the Constitution to allow. In contrast, the Vot-
ing Rights Act and RFRA restricted government in areas where
the Court found no constitutional limitations.
Finally, in some instances, the Court will have to decide what
is an expansion of rights and what is a dilution. Such an inqui-
ry, however, is not novel o unique to this area of constitutional
law. For example, the police power of states grants the authority
to protect more rights than the Court finds in the Constitution.
The Court, thus, always has had to determine whether the
state's claimed expansion of rights is really a dilution.
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins"0 is illustrative on this
point.
In PruneYard, the Supreme Court held that a state could cre-
106. It can be argued that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). The text
accompanying notes 143-50 address this argument.
107. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
108. See Human Life Bill of 1981, S. 158.
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74 (1994).
110. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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ate a state constitutional right of access to shopping centers for
speech purposes,"' even though the Supreme Court previously
ruled that no such right exists under the U.S. Constitution."'
The California Supreme Court found the right under the Cali-
fornia Constitution."' The shopping center contended that
forcing it to allow speakers violated its First Amendment rights
and constituted a taking of its property without just compensa-
tion."' The U.S. Supreme Court rejected both of these argu-
ments and held that states could recognize a state constitutional
right of access to shopping centers, even though no such right
exists under the U.S. Constitution."5
The Court concluded that the regulation did not result in a
taking because property owners retained possession of their
property and because the regulation did not substantially dimin-
ish the value of the property."' The Court found no violation of
the First Amendment because a shopping center is
not limited to the personal use of appellants .... It is instead
a business establishment that is open to the public to come
and go as they please. The views expressed by members of
the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for
a petition thus will not likely be identified with those of the
owner."
7
Moreover, the Court said that "no specific message is dictated by
the State to be displayed on appellants' property... [and] appel-
lants can expressly disavow any connection with the message by
simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or
handbillers stand.""'
In other words, in PruneYard, the Court had to decide wheth-
er the state's claimed expansion of the protestor's constitutional
rights was an impermissible diminution of the rights of the
111. See id. at 81.
112. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
113. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 78.
114. See id. at 82, 85.
115. See id. at 88.
116. See id. at 82-85.
117. Id. at 87.
118. Id.
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shopping center owners. The Court confronted the issue directly
and evaluated the claimed dilution of rights. Likewise, in imple-
menting Section 5, the Court should engage in the same type of
analysis where necessary.
The second major argument against interpreting Section 5 to
allow Congress to expand rights is based on federalism. Grant-
ing Congress the authority to increase rights constrains state
choices in that area."' The provision of the Voting Rights Act
considered in Morgan limited the ability of states to use literacy
tests. RFRA invalidated some state and local laws. Indeed, Jus-
tice Kennedy's majority opinion expressly invoked federalism in
declaring the law unconstitutional.
The question, however, is whether the Court should grant pro-
tection of states' choices more deference than Congress's desire
to expand the protection of rights. Certainly, federal laws in-
creasing rights constrain state and local governments; but why
prefer state and local autonomy over rights? Justice Kennedy
and the commentators who object on federalism grounds to
Congress's use of its Section 5 power to increase liberties leave
this question unanswered.
Traditionally, when federalism is invoked, several justifica-
tions are offered for protecting states. However, none of them
justify limiting Congress's power in this context. For example, a
primary explanation offered for protecting state governments
from federal intrusions is that the division of power vertically,
between federal and state governments, reduces the chance of
federal tyranny. Professor Rapaczynski noted that "[plerhaps the
most frequently mentioned function of the federal system is the
one it shares to a large extent with the separation of powers,
namely, the protection of the citizen against governmental op-
pression-the 'tyranny' that the Framers were so concerned
about."12
1
119. See Cohen, supra note 79, at 615; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 443;
Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA. A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 212-15 (1995).
120. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1997).
121. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Fed-
eralism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341, 380.
626 [Vol. 39:601
A CONSTITUTIONAL EXPANSION OF RIGHTS
However, if Congress is expanding rights, there is no reason
to fear tyranny. Indeed, guarding against tyranny explains why
Congress should be able to use Section 5 to expand rights with-
out implicating federalism concerns: Expansion of rights fur-
thers the ultimate end of the structure of government. Any
claim that laws that appear to protect rights actually dilute
rights collapses the federalism argument into the diminution
claim that is addressed above.
A second frequently invoked value of federalism is that states
are closer to the people and thus more likely to be responsive
to public needs and concerns.' Professor David Shapiro sum-
marized this argument when he wrote that "one of the stronger
arguments for a decentralized political structure is that, to the
extent the electorate is small, and elected representatives are
thus more immediately accountable to individuals and their
concerns, government is brought closer to the people, and demo-
cratic ideals are more fully realized.""8 If it is a choice, how-
ever, between a federal legislative process that produces more
rights and a state choice for fewer, then why prefer the latter
over the former? In other words, is responsiveness desirable
when it means that there will be fewer rights? To the contrary,
if it is accepted, as argued above, that expanding rights is de-
sirable, then responsiveness resulting in reduced rights is to be
avoided.
A final argument that commentators frequently make for pro-
tecting federalism is that states can serve as laboratories for
experimentation. Justice Brandeis apparently first articulated
this idea when he declared:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may
be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labo-
ratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."
122. See id. at 391.
123. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 92 (1995).
124. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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The same response can be made to this argument: Why protect
the ability of states to experiment at the expense of rights?
Moreover, in choosing whether to protect rights, Congress cer-
tainly can make the choice of whether to allow experimentation
or whether to impose a national standard." The creation of a
federal right by Congress arguably is a decision that protecting
the liberty is more important than permitting states to experi-
ment with it.
The point is that none of the traditional justifications for fed-
eralism warrant limiting Congress's authority under Section 5 to
expand the protection of constitutional rights. The Fourteenth
Amendment, by its very existence, is a limit on state power.
Thus, any exercise of authority under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment restricts state and local governments. Federalism should
not be a basis for limiting rights, only a way of expanding them.
Indeed, as Professor McConnell argues, "[b]y its very text...
the Fourteenth Amendment rejects the idea that the rights of
citizens should vary from state to state and group to group." 2 '
As Professor McConnell concludes, "RFRA is in accord with the
fundamental philosophy of the Fourteenth Amendment."'27
Finally, a separation-of-powers theory provides an argument
that Congress should not have the authority to expand rights
using Section 5. Professor William Cohen, for instance, argued
that Morgan "stood Marbury v. Madison on its head by judicial
deference to congressional interpretation of the
Constitution."'28 Likewise, Professor Lupu contended that:
The entire concept of RFRA is a challenge to the concept of
judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the Constitution.
On a strong reading of Marbury v. Madison, the idea that
Congress may replace the Court's view with its own concern-
ing the general rules governing our constitutional arrange-
ments is heretical, a step worse than President Franklin
125. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a Nation-
al Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 925 (1994).
126. McConnell, supra note 12, at 193.
127. Id. at 194.
128. William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 606 (1975).
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Roosevelt's attempted Court-packing in its threat to the judi-
cial role in the interpretation of the fundamental law."
Professors Eisgruber and Sager similarly say that RFRA is "a
statute at war with the Supreme Court's constitutional judg-
ment."
130
It is only with trepidation that one disagrees with four such
eminent constitutional scholars, but I believe that they, like Jus-
tice Kennedy, mistakenly assume that a Supreme Court decision
finding no right in the Constitution means that no right can ex-
ist in society. A Court decision refusing to recognize a constitu-
tional right means only that the judiciary will not safeguard the
liberty; there is nothing in that determination that precludes the
legislature from recognizing and protecting the right. A statute
protecting a right that the Court did not find in the Constitution
does not turn Marbury v. Madison on its head or challenge judi-
cial authority because there is no inconsistency in saying that a
right exists through legislative action, but not through judicial
interpretation of the Constitution.
Therefore, the key question in evaluating RFRA is whether it
is properly understood as a statute expanding rights. If so, it
should have been upheld.
IL THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM'RESTORATION ACT OF 1993 IS A
STATUTE, ENACTED UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, THAT CREATES MORE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Simply put, RFRA created a statutory right protecting individ-
uals from neutral laws of general applicability that burden reli-
gious freedom.' Congress enacted RFRA in response to a Su-
preme Court decision that interpreted the Constitution to pro-
vide no such right.'32 As such, RFRA is properly understood as
expanding rights under Congress's Section 5 authority.
129. Lupu, supra note 119, at 173, 174.
130. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 445.
131. See Religious Restoration Freedom Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (1994).
132. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith,'33 the Court
changed the law of the Free Exercise Clause dramatically. The
Court in Smith held that individuals could not use the Free Ex-
ercise Clause to challenge a neutral law of general applicabili-
ty."M In other words, regardless of how much a law burdens
religious practices, it is constitutional under Smith so long as it
does not single out religious behavior for punishment and is not
motivated by a desire to interfere with religion. For example, in
Smith, the Court said that a law prohibiting consumption of pey-
ote, a hallucinogenic substance, did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause even though some Native American religions required its
use."'35 The Court explained that the state law prohibiting con-
sumption of peyote applied to everyone in the state and did not
punish conduct solely because it was religiously motivated. 36
Smith changed the law so that a neutral law of general appli-
cability only had to meet rational basis review, but laws that
were directed at religious practices had to meet strict scruti-
ny. '3 RFRA, however, changed this by negating the effects of
the Smith decision and restoring strict scrutiny for Free Exer-
cise Clause analysis.'3 ' RFRA requires that courts use strict
scrutiny in analyzing Free Exercise Clause claims, even for
neutral laws of general applicability.'3"
In other words, Smith said that under the Free Exercise
Clause individuals had no right to be free from the burdens on
their religion resulting from neutral laws of general applicabili-
ty. RFRA created a statutory right to protect individuals from
this burden. RFRA, then, does not overturn a Supreme Court
decision requiring or prohibiting government action. RFRA sim-
ply creates a statutory right where the Court found no constitu-
tional right to exist.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 877-82.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 882.
137. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (finding that laws directed at religious practices must meet strict scrutiny).




A CONSTITUTIONAL EXPANSION OF RIGHTS
Suppose that after Smith, Oregon revised its law and created
a statutory exemption from its peyote law for Native Americans.
No one would have argued that the revision was unconstitution-
al because it overturned a Supreme Court decision. Rather, the
response would have been that the political process had created
a statutory right where the Court found that none existed under
the Constitution. RFRA does exactly-the same thing.
Admittedly, RFRA takes an unusual form because it directs the
courts to apply strict scrutiny in Free Exercise Clause cases. How-
ever, this is just another way for the legislature to declare that it
finds, by statute, a fundamental right to exist. The practical effect
of a determination that there is a fundamental right is that courts
apply strict scrutiny. Congress created the new statutory right by
specifying the test to be used to protect it. There is no reason why
this phrasing of the right is unconstitutional.
Several responses might be made to this argument. First, Pro-
fessor Lupu has argued that the Constitution limits Congress's
authority to expand rights under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to due process and equal protection; Congress,
therefore, cannot use its Section 5 power to expand the
protections of the Bill of Rights. 40 This argument, however, ig-
nores the underlying rationale behind the incorporation of the
Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court has held that the term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment includes those parts of the Bill of
Rights that are essential to freedom and justice.
Justice Cardozo said that the Due Process Clause included
"principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" and that were
therefore "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 4' Justice
Frankfurter said that due process precludes those practices that
"offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples."
In other words, the Court's incorporation decisions apply the
140. See Lupu, supra note 119, at 216.
141. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (holding that certain state
criminal procedures do not violate an accused's Fourteenth Amendment rights).
142. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(affirming the murder conviction of Admiral Dewey Adamson).
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Bill of Rights protections to the states, not because they are list-
ed in the first eight amendments, but because of their impor-
tance. Rights are protected under the Due Process Clause be-
cause they are fundamental. Accordingly, there is no basis for
drawing a distinction among these rights for purposes of
Congress's Section 5 power. Indeed, drawing such a distinction
would have the perverse effect of allowing Congress much more
authority to protect unenumerated rights than those specified in
the text. Congress could expand constitutional rights recognized
by the Supreme Court, but legislation could not increase those
found in the Bill of Rights. Such a distinction would relegate Bill
of Rights provisions to an inferior status, a result that simply
cannot be right.
A second and more serious objection to RFRA is that it vio-
lates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Such
an argument suggests not that RFRA exceeds the scope of
Congress's Section 5 power, but that it violates another clause of
the First Amendment. Congress cannot use its Section 5 author-
ity, or any of its powers, in a manner that infringes the Consti-
tution. Justice Stevens made this argument in his very short
concurring opinion in Flores,' and some scholars have made
the same point.'
A full response to this argument is beyond the scope of this
Essay. It must be noted, however, that all protection of free
exercise of religion raises Establishment Clause problems. As
the Supreme Court and many scholars have noted, there is an
inherent tension between the two constitutional provisions.'45
Indeed, under the primary test used for the Establishment
Clause, Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 ' any protection of free exercise
arguably violates the Establishment Clause. Under the Lemon
143. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
144. See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 20, at 452-55.
145. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (finding that states may
exempt from real property taxes any property owned and operated exclusively for
religious purposes); Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PrrT. L. REv. 673 (1980); William P. Marshall, Solv-
ing the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545
(1983); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123.
146. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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test, the government violates the Establishment Clause if the
government's primary purpose is to advance religion, or if the
principal effect is to aid or inhibit religion, or if there is exces-
sive government entanglement with religion. 47 Yet, any time
the government acts to protect free exercise of religion, its pri-
mary purpose is to advance religion; any time the principal
effect is to facilitate free exercise, the government is aiding reli-
gion.'48 In this sense, RFRA, by definition, has the purpose and
effect of advancing religion and thus potentially violates the
Establishment Clause.
Prior to Smith, however, the Court used strict scrutiny in
evaluating Free Exercise Clause claims. 49 Even after Smith,
the Court has indicated that it will use strict scrutiny for chal-
lenges to laws directed at religious practices. 5 ' The Court,
therefore, does not believe that use of strict scrutiny violates the
Establishment Clause. Nor is there a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause when Congress, by statute, restores strict scrutiny.
The protection of free exercise as a fundamental right should not
be deemed incompatible with the Establishment Clause.
Critics might argue that there is a difference between the
Court finding that the Constitution requires employment of
strict scrutiny and Congress imposing it; the former does not
violate the Establishment Clause, but the latter does. The an-
swer to this is that protecting free exercise of religion, as accom-
plished through RFRA, could be a compelling interest sufficient
to justify the statute even if it does infringe the Establishment
Clause. The Establishment Clause, like all rights, is not abso-
lute. The protection of free exercise of religion, as implemented
through RFRA, should meet strict scrutiny. This is not to say
that every imaginable law protecting religious freedom is im-
147. See id. at 612-13.
148. Cf. id. at 614 ("Ihe line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier .... ").
149. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional a
state law that forced public schooling in violation of religious beliefs); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding unconstitutional a state law that denied unem-
ployment benefits to a worker who refused a job because the hours violated her reli-
gious beliefs).
150. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993).
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mune from Establishment Clause scrutiny. Rather, it is to say
that the Court could find that RFRA simply returned the law to
what it was before Smith and served the compelling purpose of
protecting people from the burdens of neutral laws of general
applicability.
III. CONCLUSION: WHERE TO FROM HERE?
The beauty of deductive reasoning is that if the premises are
established, the conclusion naturally follows. Part I defended the
major premise: Congress, acting under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, may create more constitutional rights than
recognized by the Supreme Court, so long as Congress does not di-
lute or reduce existing rights. Part II established the minor prem-
ise: RFRA is a statute, enacted under Section 5, that creates more
constitutional rights and does not dilute or reduce existing rights.
Therefore, the conclusion follows: RFRA is constitutional.
But Flores, of course, held to the contrary. What now? Three
options seem most desirable. First, Congress could reenact the
law as an exercise of its remedial power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress would need to do fact-finding
to show that there is a serious problem with religious freedom
being burdened by neutral laws of general applicability. Con-
gress then could enact a law to remedy the problem. The statute
could declare the need to offer protection from such burdens on
religious freedom and could do this by instructing courts to ap-
ply strict scrutiny when such laws are challenged. This seems
entirely consistent with the conclusion of Justice Kennedy's ma-
jority opinion that Congress's power is "remedial." 5'
The Court in Flores emphasized that RFRA was not "propor-
tional" to the violations of rights.'52 This, however, is a factual
question. Congress, by fact-finding, could determine that laws of
general applicability are a serious threat to free exercise of reli-
gion and thus support the proportional relationship between a
new RFRA and the underlying problem.
151. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997).
152. See id. at 2170.
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The response to this could be that Congress only can provide
remedies for violations of what the Court has determined to be
the right. In other words, the Court in Smith found that the
Free Exercise Clause is violated only if a law burdening religion
is not neutral or is not of general applicability. 15 3 The argu-
ment is that Congress only may provide remedies for laws of
this type.
This argument, however, ignores the fact that the Supreme
Court carefully did not overrule cases like Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan"5 or City of Rome v. United States.'55 In both the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 and its 1982 amendments,'56 Congress went
substantially beyond providing remedies for rights recognized by
the judiciary. The Court had found that literacy tests were con-
stitutional,'57 but Congress adopted a law prohibiting them in
certain circumstances.'58 The Court had concluded that a vot-
ing scheme's discriminatory impact did not violate the Constitu-
tion absent proof of discriminatory intent.'59 Congress then, by
statute, provided that discriminatory impact was sufficient to
violate the law. The Court's explicit affirmance of these prece-
dents in Flores shows that Congress can provide greater protec-
tion of rights than that accorded by the Court so long as the law
is proportional to the problem. RFRA could be reenacted and
should be upheld by the Court as long as there is sufficient con-
gressional fact-finding that neutral laws of general applicability
are a serious threat to the free exercise of religion.
Second, Congress could use its Commerce Clause authority to
reenact RFRA. In light of United States v. Lopez, 6 ' Congress
would need to make findings that neutral laws of general appli-
cability impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce.
153. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-82 (1990).
154. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
155. 446 U.S. 156 (1980); see also, Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163-68 (discussing City of
Rome and Morgan).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994).
157. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649 (citing Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360
U.S. 45 (1959)).
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994).
159. See Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 50-54.
160. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional the Gun-Free School Zone Act
as exceeding the scope of Congress's commerce power).
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Congress might point, for example, to the burden that zoning
laws place on religious practices and the economic consequences
of these laws. The use of the Commerce Clause as the authority
for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides ample precedent for
using this constitutional provision to increase the protection of
rights.1
61
For Congress to use its commerce power to reenact RFRA no
more reduces religion to commercial matters than Congress's use
of the Commerce Clause to enact civil rights laws reduced
equality to a commercial matter. Rather, as with discrimination,
Congress would find that laws burdening religion have sub-
stantial cumulative impact. For instance, in Flores, additional
church construction that would have employed workers and con-
tributed to the local economy was thwarted. Congress could find
that such situations, multiplied across the country and in count-
less contexts, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Third, state governments can enact their own religious free-
dom restoration acts in order to have state courts apply strict
scrutiny to state government actions or laws that burden reli-,
gion. States, of course, pursuant to police power, may adopt any
law not prohibited by the Constitution.12 Nothing in the
Court's decision in Flores precludes a state from deciding that it
will tolerate state actions and laws that burden religion only if
they meet strict scrutiny.
There is no doubt that people have less protection for their
religious practices after Flores than they did before. Hopefully
though, this will be only temporary as legislatures find other
ways to protect individuals from neutral laws of general applica-
bility that burden religion. Hopefully, too, the Supreme Court
will uphold these laws and recognize that more is not less; legis-
latures may protect rights greater than those found in the Con-
stitution by the Supreme Court.
161. See, for example, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), that upheld Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting racial discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation.
162. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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